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Regardless of the suggested legislation, it is submitted that the three-
justice controlling opinion in the Manning case should not be accepted
as definitive of the law in regard to the solicitor's telling prospective
jurors that the State will seek the death penalty. The other three justices
said that as long as North Carolina law permits capital punishment the
State is entitled to seek the death penalty. The seventh member of the
court expressed a similar view in his dissent in State v. Pugh,3 9 where he
stated his opposition to a holding "that counsel must not contaminate
the jury with any argument as to the bearing the evidence should have
on the recommendation. '4° Thus it would appear that in a case squarely
presenting the question four members of the court would uphold the
right of the State to ask the jury not to recommend life imprisonment
and to argue on this point to some extent. Such a holding would be
more in keeping with the present law that a defendant found guilty of
a capital crime must die unless the jury recommends otherwise. On
the other hand, the fact that in Manning five justices held it error for
the solicitor to say that the only reason for having the trial was to
put defendant to death demonstrates that, regardless of their views as
to whether G.S. § 14-17 would permit the State to argue for death, a
majority of the court would reverse where such argument becomes
prejudicial per se.41
ROBERT L. LINDSEY
Trial Practice-Damages-Pain and Suffering-Per Diem
Argument to the Jury
In Ratner v. Arrington' a Florida Court of Appeals held that the
trial judge in a personal injury action had not abused his discretion in
allowing the use of the per diem argument as a measurement of pain and
suffering damages. The plaintiff's counsel had been permitted, over
objection, to use a placard in his closing argument on which were listed
various elements of plaintiff's damages, including an amount for pain
and suffering calculated at fifteen dollars per day for the length of his life
in the text whether defendant is allowed to waive the jury or not. However, since
G.S. § 14-17 seems to contemplate but one hearing, it would appear that the
adoption of the suggested system *ould require that G.S. § 14-17 be repealed and
that it be replaced with a statute allowing the jury to recommend alternative pun-
ishments. The new murder statute could provide for double hearings, or a
separate section could be enacted to accomplish the purpose.
311250 N.C. at 286, 108 S.E.2d at 655.40 250 N.C. at 289, 108 S.E.2d at 657.
"' "Prejudicial per se" is used in the text to distinguish between the types of
prejudice that the court has traditionally recognized as grounds for a new trial, and
the "possibility of prejudice" suggested by the writer as inherent in the present
single-hearing system of trial in capital cases.
111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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expectancy. In a similar action, Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v.
Harrington,2 the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
held that counsel's use of a per diem or other mathematical formula to
measure pain and suffering was error, for it allowed him to invade the
province of the jury and get before it that which did not appear in the
evidence.
In the Virginia case the plaintiff's counsel had been allowed by the
lower court to place the per diem figures for pain and suffering on a black-
board. In reversing, the Supreme Court stated that it was not improper
for counsel to use figures placed upon a blackboard, provided that the
figures were supported by the evidence. The great majority of juris-
dictions allow the use of the blackboard to some degree in a jury argu-
ment 3 The propriety of using this method to list damage elements
depends upon whether in a particular jurisdiction counsel would be
allowed to put such elements before the jury in oral argument. 4  Thus
where the court does not allow graphic illustrations of per diem figures,
its objection goes to the use of the mathematical formula applied to pain
and suffering, and not to the blackboard or other means of illustration
used.
The propriety of the per diem argument for pain and suffering dam-
ages was first litigated in 19505 and has been directly ruled upon in
nine states. Five states have sanctioned the use of the per diem argu-
ment,6 and four have condemned it.7  In W'uth v. United States,8 an
2 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959).
3 Apparently, in all jurisdictions the granting or denying of permission to use a
blackboard and the extent to which it may be used rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court. Haycock v. Christie, 249 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Upon timely
objection, however, the jury should be instructed that neither the blackboard nor
argument of counsel is evidence. Miller v. Loy, 101 Ohio App. 405, 140 N.E.2d
38 (1959) ; see 88 C.J.S. Trial § 177 (1955).
'McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 558, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958). Counsel should not
allow the damage figures to remain before the jury at any time other than during
argument. Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N.E.2d 491 (1955). The
court in Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 93 So. 2d 138 (1956), refused to make a
distinction between the use of a blackboard listing the damages prayed for and
the use of a prepared chart for the same purpose. The use of a prepared chart
would preclude the opposing counsel's erasing the figures and replacing them with
some of his own. See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1205 (1955) (use of a chart
not in evidence relating to damages) ; 1 BELLI, MoDERN TRIALS §§ 130, 133(2),
135 (1954).
'J. D. Wright & Son v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
6 (1) Alabama: McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 558, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958). (2)
Florida: Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). (3) Minne-
sota: Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1957) ;
Flarhrerty v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d 633 (1958).
In two cases prior to the Boutang case, Alstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste.
M. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955), and Hallada v. Great No. Ry., 244
Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673 (1955), the court held that the per diem arguments
could not be allowed. In Boutang, however, the court discussing these two cases
said: "In neither case did we hold that the mathematical formula may not be
used for purely illustrative purposes. In Hallada we merely held that the
segmentation process of breaking the damage picture into fragments and then
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action under the Federal'Tort Claims Act, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia sitting without a jury refused to apply the
per diem method of evaluation to pain and suffering damages. In an
admiralty action9 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, expressly
endorsed the use of the per diem formula. 10 In view of the limited num-
ber of jurisdictions which have considered the issue there would seem
to be no discernible weight of authority at this time, and even the Florida
court in the Ratner decision which allowed per diem expressed a desire
not to foreclose the question.:"
The various reasons advanced in support of the per diem argument
are as follows: (1) The very absence of a fixed standard for the mon-
etary measurement of pain and suffering is reason for allowing wide
applying to each fragment a mathematical formula whereby damages are calculated
at a fixed rate per day for the entire period of the injured person's life expectancy,
though illuminating, may be misleading and therefore may not be used as a yard-
stick for determining the reasonableness of the award for damages. This rule
does not bar the use of the mathematical formula for purely illustrative purposes."
Quacre as to the distinction between illustrative and non-illustrative use of the
per diem argument. (4) Mississippi: 4-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy,
221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954) ; Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d
744 (1957). (5) Texas: J. D. Wright & Son v. Chandler, szpra note 5 (no
objection had been made to argument at trial).
'Delaware: Henne v. Balick, - Del. -, 146 A.2d 394 (1959). (2) New
Jersey: Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). The court not only
held that a mathematical formula argument was improper but overruled prior de-
cisions in saying that any statements by counsel requesting a specific award or even
disclosing the total amount prayed for was improper. In Henne v. Balick, supra, the
court did not go this far and stated only that the per diem argument was im-
proper. (3) Pennsylvania: The court has steadfastly refused to allow counsel
to disclose the amount claimed or expected when damages are unliquidated. Thus
this state must be included with those prohibiting the per diem argument. See
Stassum v. Chapin, 234 Pa. 125, 188 Atl. 111 (1936) ; Bostwick v. Pittsburgh Rys.,
255 Pa. 387, 100 AtI. 123 (1917) ; Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Ry., 177 Pa. 1, 35 AtI.
191 (1896). (4) Virginia: Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va.
109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959).
At the time of Botta v. Brunner, supra, in 1958, the weight of authority was
clearly in favor of allowing the per diem argument. Since that time two state
courts, in Henne v. Balick, supra, and Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v. Harring-
ton, supra, and one federal court in Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.
Va. 1958), have adopted the Botta reasoning in refusing to sanction per diem. In
the two decisions allowing per diem arguments subsequent to the Botta decision,
McLaney v. Turner, supra note 6, and Ratner v. Arrington, supra, note 6, the
former was decided less than five months after Botta and did not mention that
case in following the then existing majority reasoning.8 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1958).
o Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 941 (1956), affirming 141 F. Supp. 388 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
" Admiralty courts are not bound by all the rules of evidence required in com-
mon law actions and may receive evidence which might be inadmissible in other
courts. 3 BENEDIcr, ADuMnEALTY § 381 (6th ed. 1940). It is questionable, there-
fore, whether Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, supra note 9, would be authority for the
use of the per diem argument in common law actions.
11 "The ultimate course of judicial opinion on the point [per diem] is not yet
discernible. Recent holdings, for and against the allowance of such arguments,
are not grounded on reasons of sufficient force to compel the decision either way.
Therefore, in approving the practice now we do not purport to foreclose the
question." Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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latitude in arguing these damages,12 and counsel should be allowed to
draw all proper inferences from the evidence.'3 (2) The trier of facts
should be guided by some reasonable and practical considerations, as an
award for pain and suffering should not depend upon a mere guess.' 4
(3) The per diem arguments are not evidence, but are merely illustra-
tive,15 and the jury is free to weigh the argument and pass on its credi-
bility.1
Courts not allowing this argument generally have relied on the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) Pain and suffering have no known dimensions, and
the only standard is "reasonable compensation." Thus there is no direct
correlation between money and physical or mental suffering.'7 (2) Rea-
sonable compensation for pain and suffering cannot be determined by
multiplying the life expectancy by a fixed rate per day since the varieties
and degrees of pain are infinite and differ among individuals, and in the
same individual these will vary from day to day.'8 (3) The allowance
of the argument would permit counsel to introduce factors not admissible
in evidence, since no witness would be permitted to testify as to the
reasonable award for pain and suffering.19 (4) The argument is preju-
dicial to defendant's counsel because he must either risk its effect upon
the jury or argue a lesser per diem sum. By arguing a lesser sum he
fortifies his adversary's implication that the law recognizes pain and
suffering as capable of being measured by a mathematical yardstick.20
The particular effect which the per diem argument may have upon
the jury's award for pain and suffering is difficult to ascertain. Courts
have stated that it leads to monstrous verdicts2 ' and that it puts before
the jury figures out of proportion to those which they would otherwise
have in mind.22 One of the leading exponents of the argument explains:
- Ratner v. Arrington, supra note 11.
" McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 558, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958).
"Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
941 (1956).
'SBoutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1957).1 8J. D. Wright & Son v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
1? Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
"Henne v. Balick, - Del. -, 146 A.2d 394 (1959).
"Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126
(1959).
20 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d (1958). For an interesting argument
that there is a yardstick to measure pain and suffering see Dollars-and-Sense
Appraisal in F.E.L.A. Cases, Panel Discussion at the Eighteenth Annual Law
Institute of the University of Tennessee College of Law and the Knoxville Bar
Ass'n, November 8, 1957 in 25 TENN. L. Rxv. 220, 227-30 (1958). The panelist
observes that the yardstick exists in practical experiences. When one pays fifty
dollars to an anesthetist to be free from pain for one hour during an operation, or
one similarly gives the dentist three dollars for fifteen minutes of relief, that
these are cases where a human being has to put pain in one side of the scale and
money in the other and weigh them.
" Alstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873
(1955).
" Henne v. Balick, - Del. -, 146 A.2d 394 (1958).
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When it [pain and suffering] is thus broken down into seconds
and minutes, then a jury begins to realize the real meaning of this
permanent pain and suffering of which the doctors have spoken,
and that $60,000 at $5 a day, is not an excessive award ...
Jurors must start thinking in days, minutes, and seconds and in
$5, $3, and $2, so that they can multiply to the absolute figure....
[H]e has started thinking, and when he follows this system of
multiplication he comes to a substantial figure ....
A Florida case24 illustrates the apparent effectiveness of per diem. A
nine year old child obtained a jury verdict of 248,439 dollars which
exactly coincided with counsel's demands as set out on a chart before the
jury. Of the total recovery, 102,200 dollars was awarded for future pain,
suffering, and inconveniences which had been calculated on the chart at
five dollars per day for the duration of plaintiff's life expectancy.25
The North Carolina court recognizes pain and suffering as an element
of damages for personal injuries, 26 but the propriety of the per diem
argument has never been ruled upon. This court has refrained from
laying down exacting rules as to the latitude counsel is allowed in his
argument, especially in the area of damages for personal injury.2 In
Jenkins v. North Carolina Ore Dressing Co.28 the court stated that the
propriety of counsel's argument must ordinarily be left up to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, and the court will not review his decretion
unless it is apparent that the impropriety was gross and well calculated to
prejudice the jury. The court has stated that counsel may not travel out-"
side the record and inject facts not included in the evidence. 2  Counsel
is, however, allowed to argue every phase of the law supported by the
evidence and to deduce from the evidence all reasonable inferences.80
.- 1 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 133, at 871-72 (1954).
' Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955).
"An effective per diem argument is illustrated as follows: The attorney after
telling the jury that they must determine what his client's pain and suffering are
worth in dollars and cents says, "Let's take Pat, my client, down to the waterfront.
He sees Mike, an old friend .... and says, 'Mike, I've got a job for you....
You're not going to have to work any more for the rest of your life, and the best
part of this job is... you'll never lose it.... You don't have to do any work ....
All you have to do is trade me your good back for my bad one, and I'll give you
five dollars a day for the rest of your life. Do you know what five dollars a day
for the rest of your life is? Why that's $60,000!. Of course, I realize that you are
not going to be able to do any walking, or any swimming, or driving an automobile,
or be able to sit in a moving picture show; you're going to have excruciating pain-
and suffering with this job, thirty-one million seconds a year, and once you take
it on, you'll never be able to relieve yourself of this, but you get $60,000 1'" Ad-
dress by Melvin M. Belli, Mississippi State Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, June 2,
1951, in 22 Miss. L.J. 284, 319 (1951).
Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N.C. 31, 94 S.E. 702 (1917).
27 See generally 2 McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1492(2d ed. 1956).2865 N.C. 563 (1871).
"Ilrvin v. Southern Ry., 164 N.C. 6, 37 S.E. 955 (1913).
"OLamborn v. Hollingsworth, 195 N.C. 350, 142 S.E. 19 (1928).
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There is no North Carolina case concerning the methods by which
the jury may assess pain and suffering damages. The jury must be
charged that the measure of recovery shall be a reasonable satisfaction
for the actual suffering of both body and mind which is the immediate
and necessary consequence of the injury.31
There are several factors which would seem to point toward an
approval of the per diem argument by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, when and if the issue is presented before it. First, it is required
in North Carolina that all prospective damages be reduced to their
present value,3 2 and to do this accurately the jury must ascertain the
present worth of a number of future installments.33  Thus under the
present value rule it would appear that the jury must in some manner
allot a definite sum of money for specific periods of the plaintiff's life.
Second, the North Carolina practice of reading the pleadings to the
jury informs them, through the ad damnum clause, of the amount de-
manded by the plaintiff as damages. Apparently, although there is no
case on this point, counsel in their final argument may relate to the
jury their estimate of the total worth of plaintiff's damages for pain and
suffering. The per diem argument would relate counsel's inference from
the evidence as to a portion of the total worth-the per diem worth.
Third, when the propriety of a trial practice is questioned on appeal,
the reviewing court may take judicial notice of the customary usage
of this practice in the lower courts.34 In Ratner v. Arrington5 the court
took judicial notice of the customary use in Florida trial courts of
3 Mintz v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 233 N.C. 607, 65 S.E.2d 120 (1951).
"Taylor v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 193 N.C. 775, 138 S.E. 129 (1927). In
applying this rule with respect to pain and suffering North Carolina is against the
weight of authority. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347, 1352 (1958); Annot., 154
A.L.R. 796, 801 (1945) ; 23 N.C.L. Rav. 46, 48 (1944).
A reason frequently quoted for refusing to permit a reduction of an award for
pain and suffering to its present value appears in Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Candler,
238 Fed. 880, 885 (8th Cir. 1922), where the court said: "At best the allowance
[for pain and suffering] is an estimated sum determined by the intelligence and
conscience of the jury, and we are convinced that a jury would be much more
likely to return a just verdict, considering the estimated life as one single period,
than if it should attempt to reach a verdict by dividing the life into yearly periods,
setting down yearly estimates, and then reducing the estimates to their present
value." This same reasoning is advanced by some courts in refusing to allow the
per diem argument.
.'McCoamcIC, DAMAGES § 86 (1935). The author notes two methods of
determining present value: (1) by the use of annuity tables and (2) by adding
to the sum to be paid in the future interest on the same sum during the interval,
dividing the result into the original sum, the quotient being the present value.
The incapacity of a jury to determine present value without the use of annuity
tables is apparent, unless an accountant be in their midst.
North Carolina refuses to allow the use of the annuity tables in determining
present value. Poe v. Railroad, 141 N.C. 525, 54 S.E. 406 (1906). Thus it is
doubtful that the jury gives any effect to the judge's present value charge.
", See Hanson v. Yandle, 235 N.C. 532, 70 S.E.2d 565 (1952); 31 C.J.S. Evi-
dence § 49 (1942).
' 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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damage charts and per diem arguments for pain and suffering dam-
ages. 6 Counsel in several North Carolina trial courts today are using
the per diem argument in their summation,37 and the Supreme Court
could properly take judicial notice of this practice.
It is submitted that the better rule would be to allow counsel to
argue that pain and suffering damages should be calculated on a per
diem basis. Forbidding the argument places a severe restriction on
the right and duty of an attorney to argue every phase of his case.
It denies the plaintiff the right of advocacy where the techniques of
persuasion are of crucial importance to him. Should abuse of the
privilege occur, either in application or in presentation, the appellate
judiciary has adequate processes to prevent injustice to either party.
WILLIAm H. McNAIR
"Accord, 4-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144
(1954); cf. Haley v. Hockey, 103 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
" Personal observation of trials by the writer and inquiries to practicing
attorneys concerning personal injury actions in North Carolina indicate that
damage charts and the per diem argument are often utilized without objection from
the defendant's counsel or the court.
